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Abstract—Mobile agents often travel in a hostile environment
where their security and privacy could be compromised by
any party including remote hosts in which agents visit and
get services. It was proposed in the literature that the host
visited by an agent should jointly sign a service agreement with
the agent’s home, where a proxy-signing model was deployed
and every host in the agent system can sign. We observe
that this actually poses a serious problem in that a host that
should be excluded from an underlying agent network could
also send a signed service agreement. In order to solve this
problem, we propose a secure mobile agent scheme achieving
host authentication with designated hosts, where only selected
hosts can be included in the agent network. We also present
a security model and provide a rigorous security proof to our
scheme.
Keywords-Authentication; Mobile agent security;
I. INTRODUCTION
A mobile agent can travel cross an agent network per-
forming tasks on behalf of its owner. The mobile agent
technology has drawn much attention in recent years because
of its potential to bringing new ways in electronic commerce.
As an example, a mobile agent could be released by its
owner to get the best deal from one of online sellers for
ﬁnding the best offers. It can travel around the network to
search and negotiate with the suitable sellers. After the deal
is done, it returns the result to its owner.
Although it is generally believed that mobile agent is a
powerful tool for online transactions, security and privacy
is indeed a concern. A major problem is their inability to
authenticate transactions in hostile environments [1]. When
a mobile agent arrives at a remote host, it will be fully
controlled by the host. Therefore, it is believed that it
is impossible for a mobile agent to carry out any secret
computation without exposing its secret to the malicious host
[2], [3].
There are several mobile agent authentication schemes
in the literature, where a verity of security issues were
identiﬁed. Sander and Tschudin [4] concluded the following
fundamental problems of executing mobile code: code and
execution integrity, code privacy, and computation with a
secret in public. They gave an answer to the above problems
by proposing a concept called Computing with Encrypted
Functions (CEF). Kotzanikolaou et al [1] implemented
the CEF scheme and proposed an undetachable signature
scheme based on RSA. Although their scheme could conceal
the agent owner’s private key during an execution in an
untrusted environment, it does not provide the fairness of
contract [5], since the remote host is not committed to
the transaction whereas the customer is. Therefore, the
commitment of the host is required in the transaction to
prevent impersonation attack to the host.
One of the most important security services to mobile
agent systems is non-repudiation, which provides fairness of
transactions to hosts and agent owners. Proxy signature is
thought to be an appropriate solution to the repudiation issue
in mobile agent applications. We notice that several solutions
derived from proxy signatures were published [6], [5], [7],
[8], [9], [10]. Unfortunately, many of them are insecure [8],
[11], [5], [12]. By default, a proxy-based approach such as
Lee et al [5] grants the universal signing privilege to all hosts
in the agent network; that is, any host can generate a valid
signature by executing a mobile agent. In other words, a
non-repudiation service agreement between the agent owner
and any host can be reached out of the control of the agent
owner. This assumption would be ﬁne, if the agent owner
wants to receive services from all hosts in the agent network
including the undesirable ones.
We observe that an agent owner might not regard that
all the hosts in the agent network are desirable for a
designated service. For instance, the agent owner wants
to get services such as mortgage information from some
speciﬁed banks only. Therefore, hosts that do not belong
to these banks should be excluded from the network. This
raises a challenging question: how to construct a mobile
agent network that includes only the designated hosts?
In this paper, we provide a sound answer to the question
by introducing a novel scheme, which allows designated
hosts to perform an agent task. The list of designated hosts
can be chosen by the agent owner. Our scheme can be
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regarded as a policy-based scheme, in that the agent can
carry a tamper-resistant policy data set when implementing a
task, where the hosts deﬁned in the policy are included in the
speciﬁc network and can provide services. One of features
in our scheme is that the policy can be dynamically updated
for various tasks without any additional computation cost.
This feature inherits the elegant property from the dynamic
accumulator [13], [14], [15], in that it does not increase
the size of policy data set when the policy is changed. Our
scheme also inherits the merit from proxy-based approaches
that the repudiation issue is eliminated. We also deﬁne
a rigorous security model for mobile agent transaction,
which captures the most powerful attacks including adaptive-
chosen-message and adaptive-chosen-host. These types of
attacks are not captured in the existing schemes in the
literature. The security of our scheme is based on the
hardness of Computational Difﬁe-Hellman problem in the
random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we review the typical mobile agent architecture and the
security issues of mobile agents. In Section 3, we introduce
our mobile agent architecture and the transaction procedure.
We then provide our security model in Section 4. In Section
5, we present our scheme, followed by the security proof of
our scheme in Section 6. We conclude this paper in Section
7.
II. MOBILE AGENTS AND SECURITY ISSUES
The typical architecture of a mobile agent application in
online transactions, e-trading and agent-based information
retrieval systems includes three main parties: customer,
mobile agent, and remote host. Customer is the owner of
mobile agent. With a task in mind, the customer generates a
suitable mobile agent and delegates the task to it. The mobile
agent travels in the deﬁned agent network searching for the
remote host(s) that can provide a suitable service. After a
suitable host is found, the agent is executed in the host and
interacts with the host. If the execution is successful, the
mobile agent then returns to the customer side with the
results of the execution. An agent might travel to several
hosts before ﬁnding a desirable result.
The mobile agent paradigm extends the capabilities of
traditional ways of remote communication and distributed
computing, but unfortunately raises new security issues. The
protection of an agent system is generally referred to as
two aspects: protection of an agent host and protection of a
mobile agent.
It is generally believed that protecting an agent host from
attacks by a malicious customer or a mobile agent can be
easily achieved [4], [1]. A more challenging problem is how
to protect a mobile agent from being abused by a malicious
host. Since the mobile agent is executed in the host, the
host has access to the mobile agent code. Any unprotected
information embedded in a mobile agent can be potentially
leaked to the host. In this regard, the integrity of mobile
agents is a major concern. Integrity protection of mobile
agents against malicious host can be divided into two main
categories [1]: detection and prevention.
A detection approach traces the identity of the illegitimate
transaction and misbehavior. The tracing mechanism will
reveal the malicious host after the illegal behavior happened.
However, there are many cases indicating that this kind of
solution is not sufﬁcient. A prevention approach provides an
active manner. The mobile agent is able to detect whether
the host is malicious before being executed. It can only be
executed after the host passes authentication. Otherwise, the
execution request will be denied. The mobile agent also has
the ability to conceal against the host.
Apart from the issues outlined above, fairness in an agent
transaction is also a major concern. Transaction fairness
can be referred to as the non-repudiation service to agent
transactions. In other words, the host should not be able
to deny an offer that has been promised and the customer
should not be able to deny a service he wishes to obtain. As
outlined in the introduction section, the non-repudiation ser-
vice can be provided with a suitable proxy-based approach.
Unfortunately, this kind of approach is undesirable for the
case where some speciﬁc hosts must be excluded from an
agent network. The motivation of this paper is to provide a
sound solution to this issue.
III. TASK EXECUTION PROCEDURE OF PROPOSED
MOBILE AGENT
In general, the major procedures of our mobile agent
system for executing a task in online applications consist of
the following phases: Customer Setup, Agent Setup, Agent
Dispatch, Host Execution, and Veriﬁcation.
• Customer Setup: The customer decides the services
he intends to receive and selects a set of hosts for
inclusion.
• Agent Setup: The customer generates a delegation
token based on its requirement and embeds it in the
mobile agent. This token includes the list of designated
hosts that are permitted in the agent network.
• Agent Dispatch: The mobile agent travels around the
network and searches for host from the list.
• Host Execution: When a mobile agent arrives at a
host, the host checks the validity of the delegation
token. If it is invalid, the host will stop execution;
otherwise, it will execute the mobile agent following
the designated procedure.
• Veriﬁcation: Anyone can verify whether the signed
service is valid, following the veriﬁcation algorithm.
Figure 1 demonstrates an example of a mobile agent
executing a task on behalf of its owner in a general online
application. The customer, as the initiator, selects a set of
hosts (1, 2, and 5) for inclusion. The customer then generates
a delegation token based on the task and the designated host
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Figure 1. Agent-based Online Application Architecture
list, and embeds the token in a mobile agent. Mobile agent
then travels around the network searching for the designated
hosts from the list. When an agent arrives at a host, say Host
1, Host 1 veriﬁes the delegation token prior to an execution.
Because Host 1 is in the list, it can be validated and offer
a signed service agreement satisfying the task deﬁned by
the customer. Hosts 3, 4, 6, and 7 are excluded from the
agent network, because they are not deﬁned in the delegation
token.
IV. SECURITY MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider two types of adversary: (1) malicious hosts
and (2) malicious customer. Type (1) are classiﬁed into two
subtypes: (a) malicious hosts that are in the designated host
list and (b) malicious hosts that are not in the designated
host list. To prove security in our system, we will show
that, for (a), malicious hosts are not able to generate a
valid signed service under the delegation token which is
unknown to them; and for (b), malicious hosts possess the
delegation token, but they are not able to generate a valid
signed service.
A. Existential Unforgeability Against Malicious Hosts
In this case, we assume that the adversary can query the
private key of any host it chooses, but cannot query the
private key of the customer. We allow all the malicious hosts
to collude, i.e., the adversary can obtain all private keys of
the hosts in the agent network.
1) Malicious hosts that are in the designated host list:
Here, we will show that, the probability of an adversary
A1 to output a valid signature under the delegation token
that is unknown to him is negligible. It is deﬁned using the
following game between a challenger C and an adversary
A1:
• Setup: C runs the ParaGen algorithm to obtain sys-
tem’s parameters Param.
• Key extract queries: Given an identity ID of a host
chosen by A1, C returns the private key sID correspond-
ing to ID.
• Delegation queries: A1 can choose the warrant
w adaptively and the designated host list X =
(H(ID1), H(ID2), ...,H(IDk)) adaptively, and submit
these to C. Here, k ≤ θ and θ is the upper bound
deﬁned in Param. In response, C runs the algorithm
D ← DeleGen(w,X) and returns D to A1. D is the
delegation token of combination of X and w chosen
by A1.
• Signature queries: Proceeding adaptively, A1 can re-
quest the signature of (m,w,X, IDi), where m is the
message (which is the offer in our case) that the host
needs to sign, w is the customer’s warrant, X represents
the designated host list, IDi is the identity of the host
who signs the message, and IDi is in the designated
host list. In response, C runs the algorithm to get
the delegation D ← DeleGen(w,X), then runs the
algorithm σ ← Sign(sIDi ,m,D), and returns σ to A1.
• Output: Finally, A1 outputs (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗, σ∗) and
wins the game if:
1) ID∗ is an identity of a host which is in the
designated host list X∗.
2) (w∗, X∗) has not been requested as one of the
Delegation queries.
3) (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗) has not been requested as one
of the Signature queries.
4) V erify(Param,PKC , PKID∗ ,m∗, w∗, X∗,
ID∗, σ∗) = valid.
We deﬁne SuccA1 to be the probability that the adversary
A1 wins the above game.
Deﬁnition 1: We say an adversary A1 can (t, qH∗ ,
qKE , qD, qS , )-break this scheme if A1 runs in time at most
t, A1 makes at most qH∗ hash queries, at most qKE key
extract queries, at most qD delegation queries, and at most
qS signature queries, SuccA1 is at least .
2) Malicious hosts that are not in the designated host list:
In this situation, the goal of an adversary A2 is to output a
valid signature with the host that is not in the designated host
list. We will show that, even A2 possesses the delegation
token, the probability of A2 to output a valid signature under
the delegation token is still negligible. It is deﬁned using the
following game between a challenger C and an adversaryA2.
After all the queries:
• Output: A2 outputs (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗, σ∗) and wins
the game if:
1) ID∗ is an identity of a host which is not in the
designated host list X∗.
2) V erify(Param,PKC , PKID∗ ,m∗, w∗, X∗,
ID∗, σ∗) = valid.
We deﬁne SuccA2 to be the probability that the adversary
A2 wins the above game.
Deﬁnition 2: We say an adversary A2 can (t, qH∗ ,
qKE , qD, qS , )-break this scheme if A2 runs in time at most
t, A2 makes at most qH∗ hash queries, at most qKE key
288
extract queries, at most qD delegation queries, and at most
qS signature queries, SuccA2 is at least .
B. Existential Unforgeability Against Malicious Customer
We assume that a malicious customer possesses the private
keys skC and t. We want to show that a malicious customer
cannot generate a valid signature for a host. Given a valid
signature, the host cannot deny the fact that he has signed
the message (transaction or service). It is deﬁned using the
following game between a challenger C and an adversary
A3. After all the queries:
• Output: A3 outputs (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗, σ∗) and wins
the game if:
1) ID∗ is an identity of a host which is in the
designated host list X∗.
2) (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗) has not been requested as one
of the Signature queries.
3) V erify(Param,PKC , PKID∗ ,m∗, w∗, X∗,
ID∗, σ∗) = valid.
We deﬁne SuccA3 to be the probability that the adversary
A3 wins the above game.
Deﬁnition 3: We say an adversary A3 can (t, qH∗ , qS , )-
break this scheme if A3 runs in time at most t, A3 makes
at most qH∗ hash queries, and at most qS signature queries,
SuccA3 is at least .
C. Bilinear Mapping and Complexity Deﬁnitions
Bilinear Mapping: G1 is a cyclic additive group of prime
order p with generator P . GT is a cyclic multiplicative group
with the same order p. eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT is a bilinear
pairing with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: for all a, b ∈ ZZp, eˆ(aP, bP ) = eˆ(P, P )ab.
2) Non-Degeneracy: eˆ(P, P ) = 1GT .
3) Computability: eˆ is efﬁciently computable.
In the following, we provide the complexity deﬁnitions
and assumptions used in our security proof.
Deﬁnition 4: (Computational Diffe-Hellman (CDH) on
G1) Given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, for some unknown a, b ∈R ZZp,
compute abP ∈ G1.
Deﬁnition 5: (Computational Diffe-Hellman (CDH) As-
sumption on G1) Given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, for some unknown
a, b ∈R ZZp, the following function SuccCDHA,G1 is negligible
for any polynomially bounded algorithm A.
SuccCDHA,G1 = Pr[A(P, aP, bP ) = abP : a, b ∈R ZZp].
Deﬁnition 6: (q-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman (q-SDH) on G1)
Given a tuple (P, sP, ..., sqP ), for a unknown s ∈R ZZ∗p,
compute a pair (c, 1s+cP ) where c ∈ ZZp.
Deﬁnition 7: (q-Strong Difﬁe-Hellman (q-SDH) As-
sumption on G1) Given a tuple (P, sP, ..., sqP ), for a
unknown s ∈R ZZ∗p, the following function Succq-SDHA,G1 is
negligible for any polynomially bounded algorithm A.
Succq-SDHA,G1 =
Pr[A(P, sP, ..., sqP ) = ((c, 1
s + c
P ) ∧ c ∈ ZZp)].
V. OUR SCHEME
We now construct our scheme using bilinear maps in the
random oracle model.
1) Setup:
Select (G1,GT ) as bilinear groups where |G1| =
|GT | = p for some prime p. Let P be a generator of
G1. Deﬁne the bilinear map eˆ : G1×G1 → GT . Select
four distinct secure hash functions: H , H0, H1 and H2
where H : {0, 1}∗ → ZZ∗p, H0, H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ ×
G1 → G1. The system parameter is Param =
(G1,GT , p, P, eˆ,H,H0, H1, H2).
2) Customer setup:
• Select a random number skC ∈ ZZ∗p as his private
key and compute the corresponding public key
pkC = skCP ∈ G1.
• Random select t ∈ ZZ∗p and compute a tuple
T = (P, tP, t2P, t3P, ....., tθP ), where θ is the
upper bound. e.g. the customer can only build a
designated hosts list that includes k hosts where
k ≤ θ.
• Compute E = tskCP .
• Publish PKC = (E, T, pkC) as the customer’s
public key and keep skC , t as his private keys.
3) Agent Setup:
• Build the designated host list:
– The customer chooses k hosts,
ID1, ID2, ..., IDk, and computes X =
(H(ID1), H(ID2), ...,H(IDk)) ⊂ ZZp \ {−t}
where IDi is the identity of a host and k ≤ θ.
– Compute V =
∏k
i=1(H(IDi) + t)P ∈ G1.
• The customer computes the delegation token D =
skC(H0(w, V ) + V ) where w ∈ {0, 1}∗ is his
warrant, V is a value representing the designated
host list.
• The customer embeds (w,X,D) in the mobile
agent.
4) Host Execution:
• Select a random number sIDi ∈ ZZ∗p as his private
key where IDi is his identity. The public key of
this host is PIDi = sIDiP ∈ G1.
• Verify the delegation token by checking
eˆ(D,P ) ?= eˆ(H0(w, V ), pkC)eˆ(V, pkC),
where V =
∏k
i=1(H(IDi)+t)P can be computed
using T and X without t.
• If invalid, the host stops the execution. Otherwise,
• The host computes H(IDi),
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– if H(IDi) /∈ X , the host stops the execution.
Otherwise,
– The host randomly chooses r ∈ ZZ∗p and gener-
ate the signature σ = (Σ,WIDi , R) where
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩








h∈X (h+ t)P can be com-
puted using T and X without t. m ∈ {0, 1}∗
is the message (the offer of the host for the
transaction) needs to be signed.
5) Veriﬁcation: Given Param, public keys PKC , PIDi ,
a host’s identity IDi, a warrant w, a designated host list
X , a message m, and a signature σ = (Σ,WIDi , R),
verify that
eˆ(Σ, P ) ?= eˆ(H0(w, V ), pkC) ·
eˆ(WIDi , H(IDi)pkC + E) ·
eˆ(H1(m||w||IDi, V ), PIDi) ·
eˆ(H2(m||w||IDi, V ), R).
Here, V =
∏
h∈X(h+ t)P can be computed using X
and PKC without t. If the equation holds, σ will be
accepted as a valid signed service; otherwise, rejected.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Existential Unforgeable Against Adversary A1
Theorem 1: If there exists an adversary A1 who can
(t, qH∗ , qKE , qD, qS , )-break the proposed scheme then
there exists another algorithm B who can use A1 to solve
an instance of the CDH problem in G1 with probability
SuccCDHB,G1 ≥ (1−
2
qD + qS + 2
)qD+qS (
2
qD + qS + 2
)2
in time t+c(G1,GT )(qH∗+qD+qS+qKE+1). Here c(G1,GT )
is a constant that depends on (G1,GT ).
Proof. Algorithm B is given a random instance (P, aP, bP )
of the CDH problem in G1. Its goal is to compute abP by
interacting with adversary A1. B will simulate the challenger
and interact with A1 as described below. The hash functions
H,H0, H1, H2 are regarded as the random oracles during the
proof.
Setup:
• Run the ParaGen algorithm to obtain the system’s
parameters Param.
• Set skC = a, therefore pkC = aP .
• Maintain ﬁve lists: H-list,H0-list,H1-list,H2-list
and Key-list that store the results of queries to random
oracles respectively. Initially, they are empty.
• Randomly select t ∈ ZZ∗p and compute a tuple T =
(P, tP, t2P, t3P, ....., tθP ) where θ ∈ ZZ∗p is the upper
bound of designated host list. Compute E = tskCP =
taP .
• Return Param and (E, T, pkC) to A1.
H queries: Adversary A1 can make queries to the H oracle
of the input IDi at any time, B checks the H-list ﬁrst:
• If there exists an item (IDi, hi) in the list, B will return
hi to A1.
• Otherwise, B randomly chooses hi ∈ ZZ∗p such that
there is no (., hi) entry in the list.
Then, B returns hi to A1 and adds (IDi, hi) to the H-list.
H0 queries: Proceeding adaptively, adversary A1 can make
queries to the H0 oracle of the input (wi, Vj) where wi ∈
{0, 1}∗ and Vj ∈ G1. For a query (wi, Vj), B checks the
H0-list as follows:
• If there exists an item ((wi, Vj), h0ij , cij , coin0ij) in
the list, B will return h0ij to A1.
• Otherwise, B tosses a coin coin0ij ∈ {0, 1} such that
Pr[coin0ij = 1] = δ (the value of δ will be determined
later).
– If coin0ij = 1, B chooses cij ∈R ZZ∗p and computes
h0ij = bP + cijP .
– Otherwise, coin0ij = 0, B chooses cij ∈R ZZ∗p and
computes h0ij = cijP .
If h0ij has already been in the tuple (., h0ij , ., .) of the
H0-list, then B chooses another cij and recomputes h0ij . B
then returns h0ij to A1 and adds ((wi, Vj), h0ij , cij , coin0ij)
to the H0-list.
H1 queries: Proceeding adaptively, adversary A1 can make
queries to the H1 oracle of the input (mi, wj , IDk, Vl). B
maintains an H1-list which consists of tuples (Ωijkl, h1ijkl).
For a query Ωijkl = (mi||wj ||IDk, Vl), B checks the H1-list
as follows:
• If there exists an item (Ωijkl, h1ijkl) in the list, B will
return h1ijkl to A1.
• Otherwise, B randomly chooses h1ijkl ∈ G1 such that
there is no (., h1ijkl) entry in the list.
Then, B returns h1ijkl to A1 and adds (Ωijkl, h1ijkl) to the
H1-list.
H2 queries: Proceeding adaptively, adversary A1 can make
queries to the H2 oracle of the input (mi, wj , IDk, Vl). B
maintains an H2-list which consists of tuples (Ωijkl, h2ijkl,
eijkl, coin2ijkl). For a query Ωijkl = (mi||wj ||IDk, Vl), B
checks H2-list as follows:
• If there exists an item (Ωijkl, h2ijkl, eijkl, coin2ijkl) in
the list, B will return h2ijkl to A1.
• Otherwise, B tosses a coin coin2ijkl ∈ {0, 1} such that
Pr[coin2ijkl = 1] = δ.
– If coin2ijkl = 1, B chooses eijkl ∈R ZZ∗p and
computes h2ijkl = eijklP .
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– Otherwise, coin2ijkl = 0, B chooses eijkl ∈R ZZ∗p
and computes h2ijkl = eijklP − bP .
If h2ijkl has already been in the tuple (., h2ijkl, ., .) of
the H2-list, then B chooses another eijkl and recom-
putes h2ijkl. After that, B returns h2ijkl to A1 and adds
(Ωijkl, h2ijkl, eijkl, coin2ijkl) to the H2-list.
Key extract queries: In this process, A1 can ask the private
key of any host. For a query whose identity is IDi, B checks
the Key-list:
• If there is an item (IDi, sIDi) in the Key-list, B will
return sIDi to A1.
• Otherwise, B chooses sIDi ∈R ZZ∗p.
If sIDi has already been in the tuple (., sIDi) of the Key-list,
then B chooses another sIDi . After that, B returns sIDi to A1
and adds (IDi, sIDi) to the Key-list.
Delegation queries: Proceeding adaptively, A1 can ask at
most qD delegation queries of tuple (wi, Xj) chosen by
itself. For such a query (wi, Xj), B ﬁrst computes accu-
mulator value Vj =
∏
h∈Xj (h + t)P . we assume that there
is a tuple ((wi, Vj), h0ij , cij , coin0ij) in H0-list containing
(wi, Vj). B can make an H0 query (wi, Vj) if that tuple does
not exist.
• If coin0ij = 0, then H0(wi, Vj) = h0ij = cijP . B can
compute D = a(H0(wi, Vj) + Vj) = acijP + aVj =
cijpkC + a
∏




• If coin0ij = 1, B terminates the simulation and reports
failure.
Signature queries: In this process, A1 can ask at
most qS signature queries of his choice. For a query
(mi, wj , IDk, Xl) where IDk is in the designated host list Xl.
B ﬁrst computes accumulator value Vl =
∏
h∈Xl(h + t)P .
We assume there exists tuples ((wj , Vl), h0jl, cjl, coin0jl),
(Ωijkl, h1ijkl), (Ωijkl, h2ijkl, eijkl, coin2ijkl), (IDk, sIDk)
and (IDk, hk) in the H0-list, H1-list, H2-list, Key-list and
H-list respectively. Otherwise, B can make those queries by
itself. Here, Ωijkl = (mi||wj ||IDk, Vl).
• If coin0jl = 0, then H0(wj , Vl) = h0jl = cjlP . B can
compute D = a(H0(wj , Vl) + Vl) = acjlP + aVl =
cjlpkC + a
∏
h∈Xl(h + t)P = cjlpkC +
∏
h∈Xl(h +
t)pkC . After that, B can generate a valid signature as
described in Host execution in our scheme.
• If coin0jl = 1 and coin2ijkl = 0, then H0(wj , Vl) =
bP + cjlP and H2(mi||wj ||IDk, Vl) = eijklP − bP . B
can generate a valid signature by setting R = rP =
uP + aP where u ∈R ZZ∗p, therefore
Σijkl = a(H0(wj , Vl) + Vl) +
sIDkH1(mi||wj ||IDk, Vl) +
rH2(mi||wj ||IDk, Vl)
= a(bP + cjlP ) + aVl + sIDkh1ijkl +
r(eijklP − bP )
= abP + cjlpkC + aVl + sIDkh1ijkl +
(u + a)(eijkl − b)P
= abP + cjlpkC + aVl + sIDkh1ijkl +




(h + t)pkC + sIDkh1ijkl +
ueijklP − ubP + eijklpkC ,
WIDk =
∏h=hk
h∈Xl (h + t)P and R = rP . B then returns
(Σijkl,WIDk , R) which is a valid signature to A1.
• if coin0jl = 1 and coin2ijkl = 1, B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
If B does not abort during all the queries, A1 will output
a valid message-signature tuple (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗, σ∗) with
successful probability at least . Here, σ∗ = (Σ∗,W ∗, R∗)
is a valid signature, ID∗ is the identity of the host,
w∗ is the warrant, X∗ is the designated host list and
m∗ is the message, such that ID∗ is in the designated
host list X∗, (w∗, X∗) has not been requested as
one of the delegation queries, (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗) has
not been requested as one of the signature queries.
We assume there exists tuples (ID∗, sID∗), (ID∗, h∗),
((w∗, V ∗), h0∗, c∗, coin0∗), ((m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗), h1∗) and
((m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗), h2∗, e∗, coin2∗) in the Key-list,
H-list, H0-list, H1-list and H2-list respectively.
Otherwise, B can make those queries by itself.
• If coin0∗ = 0 or coin2∗ = 0, B terminates the
simulation and reports failure.
• Otherwise, coin0∗ = 1 and coin2∗ = 1. For
this case, H0(w∗, V ∗) = h0∗ = bP + c∗P ,
H2(m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗) = h2∗ = e∗P , σ∗ =
(Σ∗,W ∗, R∗) is a valid signature. Therefore,
Σ∗ = a(bP + c∗P + V ∗) + sID∗h1∗ + r∗e∗P
= abP + c∗pkC + aV ∗ + sID∗h1∗ + e∗R∗
and abP = Σ∗ − c∗pkC −
∏
h∈X∗(h + t)pkC −
sID∗h1∗ − e∗R∗. Therefore, B successfully solves the
given instance of the CDH problem in G1.
Now we will show the successful probability for B. B can
output abP successfully if and only if:
• B does not abort during the Delegation queries. This
probability is (1− δ)qD ;
• B does not abort during the Signature queries. This
probability is (1− δ2)qS ;
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• A1 outputs a valid signature. This probability is greater
than ;
• coin0∗ = 1 and coin2∗ = 1, this probability is δ2.
The probability of B can successfully output abP is
SuccCDHB,G1 ≥ (1− δ)qD (1− δ2)qSδ2
≥ (1− δ)qD+qSδ2,
where δ = 2qD+qS+2 . It is maximized as
SuccCDHB,G1 ≥ (1−
2
qD + qS + 2
)qD+qS (
2
qD + qS + 2
)2.
Algorithm B’s running time is the same as A’s running
time plus the time it takes to respond to qH∗ random
oracle queries, qD delegation queries, qS signature queries,
qKE key extraction queries and compute abP from σ∗. We
assume each query requires at most time c(G1,GT ) which
is a constant depends on the bilinear group pair (G1,GT ).
Hence, the total running time is at most t+ c(G1,GT )(qH∗ +
qD + qS + qKE + 1). This completes the proof.
B. Existential Unforgeable Against Adversary A2
Theorem 2: If there exists an adversary A2 who can
(t, qH∗ , qKE , qD, qS , )-break the proposed scheme, then
there exists another algorithm B that can use A2 to solve an
instance of the q-SDH problem in G1 with the probability
Succq-SDHB,G1 = SuccA2 ≥ 
in time t+c(G1,GT )(qH∗+qD+qS+qKE+1). Here c(G1,GT )
is a constant that depends on (G1,GT ).
Proof. Algorithm B is given a random instance
(P, xP, x2P, ..., xqP ) of the q-SDH problem in G1. Its
goal is to compute (c, 1c+xP ) by interacting with adversaryA2. B will simulate the challenger and interact with A2
as described below. The hash functions H,H0, H1, H2 are
regarded as the random oracles during the proof.
Setup:
• Run the ParaGen algorithm to obtain the system’s
parameters Param.
• Randomly choose skC ∈ ZZ∗p as the customer’s private
key, therefore pkC = skCP .
• Maintain ﬁve lists: H-list,H0-list,H1-list,H2-list
and Key-list, as in the proof of theorem 1.
• Set T = (P, xP, x2P, ..., xqP ) where q = θ which
is the upper bound of the designated host list, and
compute E = skCxP .
• Return Param and (E, T, pkC) to A2.
H queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2 requests IDi,
B returns hi and adds (IDi, hi) to the H-list if there is no
such entry in the list.
H0 queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2 re-
quests (wi, Vj), B returns h0ij ∈R G1 to A2 and adds
((wi, Vj), h0ij) to the H0-list if there is no such entry.
H1 queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2 requests
Ωijkl = (mi||wj ||IDk, Vl). B returns h1ijkl ∈R G1 to A2
and adds (Ωijkl, h1ijkl) to the H1-list if there is no such
entry.
H2 queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2 requests
Ωijkl = (mi||wj ||IDk, Vl). B returns h2ijkl ∈R G1 to A2
and adds (Ωijkl, h2ijkl) to the H2-list if there is no such
entry.
Key extract queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2
requests IDi. B returns sIDi to A2 and adds (IDi, sIDi) to
the Key-list if there is no such entry.
Delegation queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2
requests (wi, Xj) where |Xj | ≤ q. B ﬁrst computes Vj with
the help of T and Xj , then B computes
D = skC(H0(wi, Vj) + Vj) = skCh0ij + skCVj
and returns it to A2.
Signature queries: As in the proof of theorem 1, A2
requests (mi, wj , IDk, Xl) where |Xl| ≤ q. B ﬁrst computes
Vl with the help of T and Xl, then B computes
Σijkl = skCh0jl + skCVl + sIDkh1ijkl + rh2ijkl,
WIDk =
∏h=H(IDk)
h∈Xl (h+ x)P and R = rP where r ∈R ZZ∗p.
Then B returns σ = (Σijkl,WIDk , R) to A2.
After all the queries, A2 outputs a message-signature
tuple (m∗, w∗, X∗, ID∗, σ∗) with successful probability at
least  where ID∗ is the identity of a host which is not in
the designated host list X∗ and σ∗ = (Σ∗,W ∗, R∗) is a
valid signature. We assume there exists tuples (ID∗, sID∗),
(ID∗, h∗), ((w∗, V ∗), h0∗), ((m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗), h1∗) and
((m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗), h2∗) in the Key-list, H-list, H0-list,
H1-list and H2-list respectively. Here, V ∗ =
∏
h∈X∗(h +
x)P . Therefore, it satisﬁes
eˆ(Σ∗, P ) = eˆ(H0(w∗, V ∗), pkC) ·
eˆ(W ∗, H(ID∗)pkC + E) ·
eˆ(H1(m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗), PID∗) ·
eˆ(H2(m∗||w∗||ID∗, V ∗), R∗).
From this equation, we have




and h∗ /∈ X∗. (h∗, 1h∗+xP ) can be computed with the help
of T and X∗ from the above equation, therefore the given
instance of the q-SDH problem is solved. The probability of
B to solve the given instance of the q-SDH problem is the
same as for A2 who breaks the proposed scheme. The total
running time of B is at most t+ c(G1,GT )(qH∗ + qD + qS +
qKE + 1), which is similar to the proof of theorem 1. This
completes the proof.
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C. Existential Unforgeable Against Adversary A3
Theorem 3: If there exist an adversary A3 who can
(t, qH∗ , qS , )-break the proposed scheme, then there exists
another algorithm B that can use A3 to solve an instance of








in time t+c(G1,GT )(qH∗+qS+1). Here c(G1,GT ) is a constant
that depends on (G1,GT ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. It
therefore is omitted.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a secure mobile agent that allows a mobile
agent owner to select remote hosts for the designated agent
network and eliminates the non-repudiation and misuse
problems in the proxy-based mobile agent model. We also
provided a rigorous security proof, where comparing with
other schemes our scheme is proved secure against the
strongest adversaries. We deﬁned the security model which
captures the most powerful attacks against adaptive-chosen-
message and adaptive-chosen-host in the random oracle
model.
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